Mohamed Amersi is a renowned global communications entrepreneur, philanthropist and thought leader. After studying medicine and law at the Universities of Sheffield and Cambridge, then completing an Executive MBA at Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford, Mohamed Amersi began his professional career as a corporate lawyer before going into business. He is founder and chairman of Inclusive Ventures Group. Throughout his career, driven by a desire to create a better world for everyone, Mohamed Amersi has used his position to contribute positively to society, supporting numerous charitable initiatives and social enterprises. Mohamed Amersi has worked closely with notable personalities including the Prince of Wales, Kofi Annan, Kailash Satyarthi, Nadia Murad, Muhammad Yunus and many others (https://amersifoundation.org/).

Mohamed Amersi was present today at the MEPEI and Eurodefense Conference in Bucharest. Financial Intelligence was media partner of the event.

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On Monday, the world marked one year since Hamas inflicted the worst attack on Israel since its founding. But amid remembrances for those who died on Oct. 7, there is significant global concern and condemnation about Israel’s disproportionate retaliations in Gaza and Lebanon and the possibility of an even bigger conflict against Iran.

Let me set the scene. In doing this, I am greatly indebted to so many that I have engaged with and some whose work I have read. All these are too many to acknowledge individually and some may prefer to remain anonymous.

The Israeli leadership imagines a new Middle East—one where Iran’s nuclear program is eliminated and its regional influence greatly reduced; where Israel becomes part of an alliance of pro-American Arab states, including Saudi Arabia; and where, fantasy of fantasies, the Iranian regime is overthrown. For Israel, this would result in a profound change in the balancing powers in the Middle East. The international community should find something familiar both in this vision of a pacified region and in Israel’s post–October 7 doctrine of “peace through strength” and “escalation to de-escalate.” Washington embraced similar ideas after 9/11, and they met a bitter end in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is too early to say but it cannot be ruled outbased on feedback I have received in London that at some stage, Palestinians will come to resent Hamas’s brutal recklessness, which has led to more Palestinian bloodshed even than the catastrophe of 1948. The attack on October 7 did incalculable damage to the Palestinian national movement and prospects for statehood. And if Hamas dreams that it can ever take over the Palestine Liberation Organization and speak for its people at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, the group has not grasped reality.

Israel, too, may be facing a rude awakening. Its global isolation will be real and long! Its degradation of Hezbollah, which Iran sees as its forward defence force, may accelerate Iran to pursue nuclear weaponisation by renouncing the NPT. Attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities could set this process back somewhat but Iran will surely succeed if that becomes the regime’s single-minded goal of achieving the deterrence that it rightfully craves. No one can catalyse regime change in Iran if domestic conditions are not ripe for it—and there’s no sign that they are or will be in my lifetime. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has made clear that it will not normalize relations with Israel or contemplate any alliance unless the Palestinian issue is resolved. No amount of Israeli military success will change that.

As for the Israel/Palestine conflict, since engaging on foreign policy matters, I’ve concluded that people have two choices. You can make a judgment that you’re going to support one side in the conflict. Or you can acknowledge that this enduring calamity is a competition between two justices, as can be seen from the slogan adopted by both, “From the River to the Sea”. It will be resolved or won’t be resolved based on Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are prepared to recognize that each side has mutual needs and requirements which need to be satisfied. This conflict is also not easily capable of objective analysis. We are all the sum totals of our experiences, of our backgrounds, environment and of our prejudices. A prejudice is a prejudgment. I would argue that the best you can do is make allowances for any prejudgments that one may have, set them aside in an effort to try to understand the narratives and the motivations of all protagonists. This is critically important if we are going to ever have a chance, to resolve and to work towards a conflict-ending resolution. And we need honest brokers who use their leverage in a balanced manner. For now, Western policy has been trying to both deter and de-escalate at the same time, and realistically speaking, you can most effectively do one or the other, butnot both. For the West, going forward the challenge is how to turn Israeli tactical wins in battle into a strategy that secures Israel’s people and its future. That takes real discipline, courage and foresight to match the conduct of war to a clear and sustainable set of realistically achievable objectives. That is never easy, but a pre-requisite!

A question that is very alive in my mind is whether October 7th was so seismic that it will lead to transformational change or are we likely after a while to return to the status quo ante? “There’s no going back to the status quo as it stood on Oct. 6, U.S. President Joe Biden said on Oct. 25. “Israel was one country on Oct. 6 and another on Oct. 7.”

In this context, it is also said that Iran’s axis or resistance which was there in full display before Oct 7th, has crumbled. But to that I would say, not so quick: The possible to regroup is very real and can be orchestrated. It will be compounded if continued asymmetrical tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel devolved into a futile cycle of Iranian missile strikes and Israeli retaliations, each exposing Tehran’s perceived military limitations while failing to alter the balance – and potentially driving Iran toward more unpredictable measures in its quest for credible deterrence.

In my view, it cannot be assumed that the Israeli-Iranian conflict will end soon; instead there will be competition between the production rate and sophistication of Iran’s offensive systems on the one hand on the other of Israel’s interception systems on the other.

With Israel now so deeply immersed in a widening conflict, it is unclear whether it can escape the so- called the “escalatory trap”. If Israel escalates, it fuels the escalatory spiral that could, at some point, exceed its military capability to manage. If it chooses the status quo, then it has done little to improve its security situation. Forcing the choice between escalation and the status quo gives Iran, anadvantage and is a key feature of its proxy strategy.

The Middle East continues to be besieged by 3 at least conflicts. Management rather than resolution is what the West’s sporadic meddling has thus far achieved. Resolution now seems to be further away than ever before. But it is worth noting that every breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict (with the exception of the Abraham Accords) was preceded by insurgency and war. The 1973 war led to Egyptian-Israeli peace; Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait produced the Madrid peace conference; and the First Intifada resulted in the Oslo Accords.

Yet it is correctly said that the Middle East has often proved to be unpredictably predictable.

It’s clear that last year’s traumas, which went far beyond any of these historical conflicts will produce pain. But it is said that the status quo only changes when pain is married to gain. I think it’s morally defeatist to say that there will never be a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the October 7 attack and Israel’s response may have irreversibly traumatised both parties at least for the medium term. And it is rightfully said, the takeaway here is going to be quite clear: Israelis and Palestinians are going to say to one another, “You know, the problem is not that we don’t understand one another. The problem is that we understand one another only too well.”

Even in Gaza, where Israel continues its overarching military campaign, a political change is hardly guaranteed. Perhaps the most candid assessment of the fate of Hamas, as outlined in a confidential Israeli security document,widely circulated among the political echelon is that “Hamas will survive this [IDF] campaign as a terror group and a guerrilla organisation.”

But, there’s no doubt that Hamas has been profoundly weakened as a military organization, and its capacity to pull off another Oct. 7 is greatly impaired. And while polls suggest that its popularity has surged in the West Bank, this is because it benefits from being the only organized alternative to a bankrupt and sclerotic PA. The most recent authoritative poll revealed that a majority ofPalestinians in Gaza believe Hamas will win the war and resume its rule.

Why is Hamas still relevant when its policies have brought such suffering to Palestinians? First, Palestinians are more likely to blame Israel for their misfortunes rather than their own leadership. Polls show clearly that mostPalestinians believed the Hamas attack was justified by the Israeli occupation. Second, Hamas’s resilience is linked to the dysfunction of the PA and the awkward reality is that under current circumstances, there’s little chance of the PA—revitalized or otherwise—returning to govern Gaza without Hamas consent.

Then there’s the Israeli factor. It’s hard to imagine a better recruiting agency for Hamas’s and other proxy’s extremism than the current Israeli government. The axis of resistance are united in the organizational embodiment of an idea—the end of Israel and its replacement with an Islamic state. However, absence of a meaningful pathway to a 2 state solution, it is difficult to understand how enshrined this is especially if the Palestinians accept a 2 state outcome.

As for Israel, it’s understandable that many would assume that the days of an Israeli leader who presided over the worst attack in the nation’s history and the bloodiest day for Jews since the Holocaust would be numbered and that prognosis may well prove correct. But for now, PM Netanyahu has prevailed. It is said that he represents a glorified real estate speculator who wants to acquire as much land as possible by any means possible. But let’s face it, even if and when he leaves office, his successor may not have the capacity to instil meaningful change in Israel’s foreign policy. That a majority of Israelis are tired of Netanyahu does not mean they are drifting leftward, oppose his approach toward Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran or support Palestinian statehood. More than 90% of Israeli Jews believe that the government is using the right amount of force against Hamas and Hezbollahor should use more.

As for Lebanon, since the crisis began, diplomatic efforts by the United States and France have laid the basis for a more durable, formal arrangement on the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon by implementing UN Resolution 1701. These talks have stalled but will likely resume. I have been privileged to have been involved in them and continue to be engaged.

Finally, some have pointed to the promise of a Saudi peace offer and with that reconciliation with the entire Arab world as a solution. But grand plans don’t necessarily produce grand results. Yesterday, Senator Lindsay Graham in the US, once again repeated this grand bargain. The Biden administration’s scheme to transform the Middle East—a mix of low-income, high-population states and high-income, low-population states—by uniting the region’s richest country and its most technologically advanced one is certainly ambitious. But it’s also somewhat divorced from the realities of Middle Eastern governance. That this grand bargain is predicated on an enduring resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is in turn premised on unlikely developments in Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics, confers a surreal quality to claims about transformation.

But all in all, if you’re anticipating transformation, an old Spanish proverb comes to mind: “Best to wait, sitting down.”